SPAE

A Single Pass Authenticated Encryption scheme

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Secure IC with external flash memory

- Typical secure element/smart card: internal flash memory (everything on single chip)
- Our goals:
  - Use external flash memory
  - Achieve same security level



What could go wrong ?

- On the fly traffic analysis
- Replay attacks



Clear need for:

- Confidentiality
- Authenticity
- Freshness

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

Clear need for:

- Confidentiality
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- Freshness

$\Rightarrow$ We need an Authenticated Encryption scheme.

Authenticated Encryption (AE or AEAD)

Symmetric encrypt-sign and decrypt-verify in a single algorithm





Our use case:

- NONCE N generated and stored inside the secure element
- Cipher-text C and TAG stored outside

Requirements of our scheme

Optimization goals:

- Silicon area,
- Performance, energy efficiency (small message size),
- Development effort.

In the context of a secure element/smart card, this means:

- Use AES (market constraint),
- Use simple linear operators (XOR, rotate...),
- Fast in single thread $\Rightarrow$ Single Pass,
- Prevent DFA attacks at algorithm level.

Existing AE schemes

- 2 Passes:
  - AES-GCM[MV04]
  - AES-CCM [Dwo04]
  - COLM [ABD+15] [1]
  - SIV [RS07]
- Not using AES:
  - NORX [AJN14]
  - ASCON [DEMS16]
  - CHACHA20-POLY1305 [Ber08], [Ber05], RFC7539
- Ideal but patented:
  - OCB[RBB03]

[1] Final portofolio members of CAESAR [Ber14] in green

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$\Rightarrow$ We need a new AE scheme.

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SPAE overview



a: number of AD blocks
m: number of message blocks
$\mathtt{AT}_a$: tag over AD

KN: key derived from K and N
$\mathtt{PT}_0$,$\mathtt{CT}_0$: initialization values
$\mathtt{PT}_m$,$\mathtt{CT}_m$: message tag values

SPAE Associated Data processing



Ek: block cipher call with key $\mathtt{K}$, for example AES-128.

Equations

$\mathtt{AT}_0 = 0 \quad \mathtt{AT}_{i+1} = E_{\mathtt{K}}(\mathtt{AT}_i \oplus \mathtt{A}_i) \quad \mathtt{A}_i$ are blocks of associated data

SPAE Initialization and key derivation



Equations

$\mathtt{KN} = \mathtt{NONCE} \oplus \mathtt{K}$

$\mathtt{CT}_0 = E_{\mathtt{K}}(\mathtt{K})$

$\mathtt{PT}_0 = \mathtt{K} \oplus \mathtt{CT}_0$

$\mathtt{PT}_0$ and $\mathtt{CT}_0$ can be precomputed.

Design Rationale

We choose those values to be strongly linked with the key since their secrecy is crucial to the security of the scheme.

SPAE message processing



Equations

$\mathtt{C}_i = E_{\mathtt{KN}}(\mathtt{PT}_i \oplus \mathtt{P}_i) \oplus \mathtt{CT}_i$

$\mathtt{PT}_{i+1} = E_{\mathtt{KN}}(\mathtt{PT}_i \oplus \mathtt{P}_i) \oplus \mathtt{P}_i$

$\mathtt{CT}_{i+1} = \mathtt{PT}_i \oplus \mathtt{CT}_i$

Reminders

$\mathtt{KN} = \mathtt{K} \oplus \mathtt{NONCE}$

$\mathtt{P}_i(\mathtt{C}_i)$ are blocks of plain(cipher)-text.

We aim to instantiate *AES* for E.

SPAE TAG generation for $m > 0$



Equations

$\mathtt{MT} = \mathit{HSWAP}(\mathtt{CT}_m) \oplus \mathtt{PT}_m \qquad \mathtt{IT} = \mathtt{AT}_a \oplus \mathtt{MT}$

$\mathtt{TAG} = E_{\mathtt{KN}}(\mathtt{IT} \oplus \mathtt{PADINFO}) \oplus \mathtt{CT}_m$

Security of the scheme

Setting of the attacker

The attacker is able to ask the encryption of any triple (N^i, A^i, M^i) but can ask only once an encryption with a same nonce N.

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The attacker is able to ask the encryption of any triple (N^i, A^i, M^i) but can ask only once an encryption with a same nonce N.

Proposition

The attacker is not able to get a pair of values $(X, E_{\mathtt{KN}}(X))$ with some constant block X.

Idea of the proof: We look at all the relations between the variables and the reuse of outputs.

Rationale Design

We choose to have two distincts internal variables to protect the knowledge of pairs of values $(X, E_{\mathtt{KN}}(X))$.

Differential analysis

Proposition

The resilience of the scheme to differential attacks is as strong as the one of the encryption function E_K (which we aim to be AES).

Idea of the proof: To estimate the security, we upper bound the maximum probability of differential pairs $(\delta X, \delta Y)$ we could get with the differential pair of the encryption function E_K.

Differential Fault Analysis

The design of the scheme has been made with the aim to minimize the necessity to protect the use of $E_{\mathtt{K}}$.

- For encryption and decryption we need only to protect the production of the `TAG`.

Design Rationale

- Using a key $\mathtt{KN} = \mathtt{K} \oplus \mathtt{NONCE}$ dependant of the `NONCE` is a benefical choice against DFA.
- Using *HSWAP* was motivated by DFA to avoid cancellation of non symmetrical faults in decryption.

Privacy of the scheme

Proposition

If the the adversary, "respecting the rules", asks q queries (N, A^i, M^i) that entails σ_n blockcipher calls of $E_{\mathtt{KN}}$ then

$$\mathtt{Adv}_{\Pi}^{priv} \leqslant \frac{1.5\sigma_n(\sigma_n - 1)}{2^{blocksize}}.$$

For example with AES $blocksize = 128$.

Idea of the proof: We use a game playing argument measuring the distance to a perfect blockcipher (see lemma 3 of Krovetz and Rogaway [KR11] for details).

Authenticity of the scheme

Proposition

If the adversary asks q queries that entails σ blockcipher calls then

$$\mathtt{Adv}_{\Pi}^{auth} \leqslant \frac{1}{\Gamma}$$

with Γ the size of the codomain of the function $(x) \mapsto x \oplus E_{\mathtt{K}}(x)$.

Idea of the proof We make a strong supposition for the attacker and we conclude by the fact that the attacker does not know any couple of values $X, E_{\mathtt{K}}(X)$.

Benchmark: ARM-Cortex-M4

- AES implementations:
  - MMCAU: Flexible cryptographic accelerator,
  - FAST: Software AES optimized for speed (use 8 Kbytes Tbox LUT),
  - SMALL: Software AES optimized for size (use 256 bytes Sbox LUT).

Table: MbedTLS benchmark[2] on FRDM-K64F board, 1024 bytes messages

Algorithm	AES implementation	Kbytes/s	cycles/byte
AES-SPAE-128	MMCAU	3101	37.8
AES-SPAE-128	FAST	1141	102.9
AES-SPAE-128	SMALL	546	215.1
AES-GCM-128	FAST	401	293.0
AES-CCM-128	FAST	476	246.8

[2] Benchmarking code taken from `https://github.com/wolfeidau/mbedtls`

Benchmark: ARM-Cortex-M0

STM32L011K4 is a low end device:

- no hardware AES,
- only 16KB FLASH, 2KB RAM.

Table: Benchmark on STM32L011 Nucleo board

	clock cycles	cycles/byte
SPAE	18.2K	1140
CCM	42.0K	2627
OCB	43.0K	2689
GCM	65.6K	4100

Scenario: encrypt and authenticate a 16 bytes message
CCM,OCB and GCM implementations from CIFRA library[3]

[3] `https://github.com/ctz/cifra`

Conclusion

SPAE is a new AE algorithm:

- Single pass,
- Use only a block cipher and XOR,
- With AES, it is faster than AES-GCM and AES-CCM[4],
- Not patented,
- Some security bounds,
- Some algorithmic level fault attack protections,
- Python and C code available at `https://github.com/TiempoSecure/SPAE`.

Further work:

- Adaptation to AES-256 (only about `KN`).
- Practical evaluation of fault attacks[5].

[4] On typical low end MCUs where parallelization is not possible
[5] Feel free to ask us for a STM32 nucleo board to challenge our claims

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Computation of PADINFO





SPAE tag generation for m=0



$\mathtt{TAG}_{null} = \mathtt{PT}_0 \oplus E_{\mathtt{KN}}(\mathtt{K} \oplus \mathtt{FF}) = \mathtt{K} \oplus E_{\mathtt{K}}(\mathtt{K}) \oplus E_{\mathtt{KN}}(\mathtt{K} \oplus \mathtt{FF})$

FF in the formulae prevents $\mathtt{TAG} = \mathtt{K}$ for $\mathtt{NONCE} = 0$